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This paper develops a new and conceptually distinctive analysis of 
Americanization in European and Japanese industry after the Second World War, 
based on a comparative research project involving an international group of 
scholars. The project highlights the autonomous and creative role of local actors in 
selectively adapting US technology and management methods to suit local 
conditions and, strikingly, in creating new hybrid forms that combined indigenous 
and foreign practices in unforeseen but often remarkably competitive ways. Its 
findings will be of compelling interest not only to historians and social scientists 
concerned with the dynamics of postwar economic growth and industrial 
development, but also to those engaged in contemporary debates about the 
crossnational transfer and diffusion of productive models.
The paper itself is divided into three main sections. The first section re­
examines the historiography of postwar Americanization, highlighting the 
theoretical assumptions underlying contending perspectives in order to bring out 
the distinctive features of the conceptual approach developed in this project. Only 
by substantially modifying or discarding altogether a series of widely-held 
assumptions about the nature and transferability of productive models, it argues, 
can the pervasive evidence of selective adaptation and innovative modification of 
US techniques and methods uncovered by our research be convincingly 
accommodated. The second section draws together the empirical findings of the 
project to sketch out a complex, multi-levelled comparative analysis of similarities 
and variations in postwar European and Japanese engagements with the American 
model across firms, sectors, and national economies, stressing the creativity and 
reflexivity of local actors together with the resulting proliferation of hybrid forms 
and practices. The third and final section considers the implications of our 
interpretation of postwar Americanization for current debates on the transfer and 
diffusion of foreign productive models across national borders, underlining the 
historical grounds for skepticism about the likelihood and desirability of 
international convergence around any single “best practice” model of economic and 























































































































































































A conspicuous feature of the development of the modem world economy has been 
the emergence of new models of productive efficiency and their attempted 
diffusion across national boundaries. Britain in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries; the United States from the late nineteenth century through the 
1960s, and once again perhaps in the 1990s; Japan in the 1970s and 80s: each of 
these countries generated innovations in technology and business organization 
which were widely believed to define a transnational standard of productive 
efficiency. In each case, foreign observers flocked to the rising industrial power of 
the day to determine the secrets of its success, while business people and 
government officials sought through a variety of means to transplant the new 
methods into their own domestic soil. In each case, moreover, such experiments 
touched off far-reaching debates about the essential features of the new production 
paradigm; its economic, social, cultural, institutional, and political preconditions; 
and its transferability across national borders.1
Although responses have varied widely across firms, countries, and periods -  
and any definitive judgement would be premature in the most recent cases -  
historical experience suggests that wholesale imitation of foreign “best practice” 
has typically proved less common than piecemeal borrowing and selective 
adaptation to suit the divergent requirements of local economic and institutional 
circumstances. Often, too, such incremental modifications of the internationally 
dominant model have given rise to innovative hybrids which became sources of 
competitive advantage in their own right -  as in the case of Japanese 
manufacturers’ postwar transformation of US mass-production techniques. 2 In 
theory as in history, moreover, there are strong grounds for believing that “any 
successful imitation of foreign organizational patterns requires innovation”, and 
that “the process of transfer and adaptation of a productive model from a parent 
context to another site will always lead to the hybridization of the logic and 
elements of the productive organization” because of inevitable differences between 
the original and new environments. Modification and hybridization of imported 
technology and management methods, on this view, should not be understood as a 
negative expression of domestic resistance to the transfer process, nor even as a 
regrettable if perhaps necessary consequence of compromises in adapting a foreign 
“best practice” model to fit local constraints, but rather as a positive opportunity for 
decentralized innovation and learning by self-reflective actors.3
This paper focuses on the largest and to date most significant example of this 
global phenomenon: that of Americanization after the Second World War. For a 
central problem confronting Western European countries and Japan alike was how 




























































































unquestionably the dominant economic and military power of the postwar world. 
To contemporaries on both sides of the Atlantic and Pacific, the “American model” 
meant above all mass production -  the high-volume manufacture of standardized 
goods using special-purpose machinery and predominantly unskilled labour -  
together with the host of “systematic” management techniques, organizational 
structures, and research and marketing services developed for its efficient 
administration and effective exploitation. Beyond the intrinsic appeal of such 
methods to nations aspiring to emulate American productivity and abundance, US 
policy makers actively sought to promote their diffusion through the technical 
assistance programs and counterpart funds associated with the Marshall Plan in 
Europe and on a more modest scale with the military occupation and procurement 
authorities in Japan. At a deeper level, finally, US officials and business leaders 
aimed to recast European and Japanese patterns of corporate organization and 
competitive order through assertive support for antitrust, decartellization, and 
déconcentration policies, together with international market integration and trade 
liberalization.4
Much of the historical literature on postwar Americanization has tended to 
assume without extensive supporting evidence that this process proceeded 
relatively smoothly and rapidly, at least in its narrowly economic and technological 
dimensions. The real barriers to Americanization, from this perspective, lay rather 
in the social, cultural, institutional, and political spheres, where established elites 
and popular classes each proved reluctant, to varying degrees and for different 
reasons, to embrace transatlantic models of labour-management relations, mass 
consumption, and macroeconomic management. Western Europe, as one influential 
formulation puts it, was only “half-Americanized” during the postwar 
reconstruction period; but productive organization and techniques in such accounts 
are squarely allocated to the “Americanized” half.5 Even where the limits of 
industrial Americanization are recognized, as in recent studies of postwar Britain, 
the persistence of “pre-Fordisf ’ production methods is typically taken as a sign of 
backwardness and complacency, an avatar of and contributory factor in the 
subsequent decline of domestic manufacturing.6 Only in the Japanese case has there 
been much explicit discussion of possible efficiency gains obtained by modifying 
the American model to suit local circumstances; and even there, the reconstruction 
of the postwar workplace is often nonetheless assimilated to the broader triumph of 
a transnational “politics of productivity” exported from the United States.7 Yet in 
an era when American manufacturers have themselves struggled to respond to the 
challenges of new competitive strategies based on greater product diversity and 
productive flexibility, there can be little justification for considering mass 




























































































during the 1940s and 50s as a universal model of industrial efficiency which other 
nations failed to embrace at their peril.8
Based on the results of a collaborative research project by an international 
group of leading scholars, this paper seeks to develop a new comparative analysis 
of industrial Americanization in postwar Europe and Japan aimed at overcoming 
the conceptual limitations of the existing literature in a number of respects. First, 
we closely examine European and Japanese responses to postwar efforts at 
promoting the transfer and diffusion of US management methods and 
manufacturing practice. Paying particular attention to issues of impact and 
implementation at the level of individual sectors and firms, we emphasize the 
autonomous and creative role of local actors in the reception -  both positive and 
negative -  of American techniques and methods, above and beyond the influence of 
US government agencies, Marshall Plan institutions, or national productivity 
councils. Second, we look carefully not only at what the historical actors did, but 
also at why they did it: at the processes of reflection and debate, both public and 
private, which underlay their strategies and choices. Historical actors, like 
contemporary historians, disagreed sharply about the possibilities and limitations of 
postwar Americanization in different national and sectoral contexts, while the 
ensuing debates, often exercised a decisive influence on the decisions taken, and 
thus on the trajectory of economic development in the broadest sense. 
Contemporary objections to the American model, as we shall see, were not purely 
socio-cultural, nor can they easily be dismissed as blinkered conservatism even in 
hindsight: on the contrary, their economic and technological reservations 
foreshadowed much of the subsequent critique of US manufacturing practice in the 
face of the Japanese challenge. Third, we treat established market and industrial 
structures not simply as objective parameters for entrepreneurial decisionmaking, 
but rather as contested terrains whose contours were shaped by rival visions -  both 
foreign and domestic -  of the bases for competitive order, technical efficiency, and 
democratic stability in a modem economy. Fourth, rather than posing the problem 
in terms of wholesale acceptance or rejection of the American model, we 
underscore instead the importance of selective adaptation to fit the demands of 
domestic markets and institutions, giving rise to a multiplicity of hybrid forms of 
productive organization, some of which would eventually develop into significant 
innovations in their own right. Such creative modifications of US practice, as the 
participants in this project found, could be observed not only among outspoken 
critics of Americanization, but also paradoxically among many of its most ardent 
European and Japanese admirers. For all these reasons, finally, we argue for a shift 
in analytical perspective from the transfer and diffusion of US technology and 




























































































preferring in the end to speak not so much of “Americanization”, or even of its 
limits, but rather of “American engagements”, with all its multiple, ambivalent, and 
actively charged connotations.
The balance of this paper is divided into three main sections. The first 
section re-examines the historiography of postwar Americanization, highlighting 
the theoretical assumptions underlying contending perspectives in order to bring 
out the distinctive features of the conceptual approach developed in this project. 
Only by substantially modifying or discarding altogether a series of widely-held 
assumptions about the nature and transferability of productive models, it argues, 
can the pervasive evidence of selective adaptation and innovative modification of 
US techniques and methods uncovered by our research be convincingly 
accommodated. The second section draws together the project’s empirical findings 
to sketch out a complex, multi-levelled comparative analysis of similarities and 
variations in postwar European and Japanese engagements with the American 
model across firms, sectors, and national economies, stressing the creativity and 
reflexivity of local actors together with the resulting proliferation of hybrid forms 
and practices. The third and final section of the paper considers the implications of 
our interpretation of postwar Americanization for current debates on the transfer 
and diffusion of foreign productive models across national borders, underlining the 
historical grounds for skepticism about the likelihood and desirability of 
international convergence around any single “best practice” model of economic and 
technological efficiency, whether Japanese or Anglo-American.
I. POSTWAR AMERICANIZATION: CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES AND 
THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS
Few historiographical propositions are more deeply entrenched than the claim that 
the transfer of US technology and managerial know-how lay at the heart of the 
extraordinary economic growth experienced by Western Europe and Japan during 
the “golden age” of the long postwar boom. This view, which originated in the self­
presentation of the Marshall Plan institutions and their contemporary supporters, 
has been reinvigorated over the past decade and a half by the burgeoning economic 
literature on international catch-up and convergence of productivity. “The spread of 
best practice American technologies and systems of work organization throughout 
Western Europe and Japan”, write Andrew Glyn, Alan Hughes, Alain Lipietz, and 
Ajit Singh in a widely-cited essay on “The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age”, “was 
reflected at the macroeconomic level in the slow process of ‘catch-up’ of average 




























































































to the US to bring back the message as to how American prosperity could be 
emulated.” “High [postwar] growth”, Nicholas Crafts and Gianni Toniolo likewise 
observe in an overview of current historical-economic research, “was made 
possible by the gains deriving from the transfer of the (Taylorist) mass production 
technology in a receptive (socially capable) environment stabilized by a strong 
American leadership”.9
Many postwar historians carry this interpretation further in stressing not only 
the transfer of American production techniques and management methods to 
Western Europe and Japan, but also the realignment of economic structures, 
institutions, and practices in the latter countries with those of the United States. 
Thus as John Killick contends in a recent synthetic text on the United States and 
European reconstruction:
“Since 1945, the European economy has developed many characteristically American 
features. For instance, huge increases in intra-European trade, encouraged by improved 
transport and EC legislation, have produced large-scale industrial restructunng and many 
firms now operate throughout Europe. These new corporations are organised more like 
American oligopolies than traditional British or German firms: their managers use 
American methods, often learned in American-style management schools; their products 
and services are advertised in American-style media and are marketed in American-type 
stores. This market is kept closer to full employment than in the 1930s by the use of 
relatively active and coordinated fiscal and monetary policies -  which were developed, in 
key respects, in the USA. The market is policed by European adaptations of American 
anti-trust legislation and regulatory agencies”.10
Much writing in this vein similarly emphasizes the more or less transformative 
influence on West European and Japanese society resulting from the postwar 
diffusion of American models of mass consumption, commercialized culture, 
industrial relations, and the displacement of distributive conflict by an ideological 
consensus around the pursuit of economic growth -  what Charles Maier has 
influentially termed “the politics of productivity”. Radio, television, advertising, 
and above all Hollywood cinema, according to this view, worked alongside 
Marshall Plan propaganda to diffuse seductive images of the “American way of 
life”, driving "the demand side of the economic and social transformation, speeding 
and channelling the changes in mentality and behaviour” towards an Americanized 
“era of high mass consumption”. 11
For other postwar historians, however, the European and Japanese adoption 
of US production techniques and management methods was not matched, at least in 




























































































institutional, and political components of the American model. Business and 
political elites in many countries, on this view, long remained highly skeptical of, if 
not actively hostile to, the New Deal-inspired dimensions of the Marshall Plan 
program such as high wages, domestic mass consumption, cooperative union- 
management relations, public welfare expenditure, decartellization, and Keynesian 
macroeconomic management, as well to US proposals for international market 
integration and the liberalization of trade and payments. Important and in some 
cases dominant sections of the labor movement likewise rejected the US-sponsored 
vision of a productivity partnership between depoliticized unions and progressive 
managements based on plant-level contractual bargaining. For all these reasons, US 
diplomatic historian Michael Hogan concludes, borrowing a phrase from Pier Paolo 
d’Attore’s analysis of Italy, “In the end [...] Western Europe was only ‘half- 
Americanized’”; whereas “the Marshall Plan had aimed to remake Europe in an 
American mode...America was made the European way” -  a judgement which 
could readily be extended with appropriate modifications to the Japanese case.12
In response to the conflicting evidence thrown up by the opposed positions in 
this debate, some recent accounts of postwar Americanization accordingly 
emphasize the coexistence of trends towards international convergence of 
productive systems resulting from the attempted diffusion of the US model with the 
continuing persistence of national differences. Postwar Americanization, on this 
view, involved not only a transfer of US production techniques and management 
methods to Western Europe and Japan, but also a partial transformation of 
economic structures, institutions, and socio-cultural practices. The extent and forms 
of this latter transformation, however, varied across countries depending on pre­
existing features of their domestic environment, together with the opportunities 
these created for local resistance to the adoption of the American model. Thus as 
David Ellwood writes in his broad synthetic text Rebuilding Europe:
“In historical terms Americanisation appears as a particularly distinctive form of 
modernisation, superimposed with great political, economic and cultural force... on each 
European country’s own variant....Every nation arrived at its own synthesis of production 
and consumption, of collective and individual spending, of traditional ways and new 
practices directed to growth”. 13
Or as Marie-Laure Djelic puts it more theoretically in her comparative sociological 




























































































“[...] The American model was not accepted nor adopted to the same extent in all 
Western European economies. National peculiarities remained and they were more or less 
significant in each case. Indeed, for each country, the transfer process was embedded in 
different economic, political, cultural, and institutional environments. In turn, those 
national differences had an impact not only on transfer mechanisms and their efficiency 
but also on the nature and degree of resistance and opposition that was to emerge, 
nationally, to the cross-national transfer process”. 14
Whereas Djelic and others influenced by the new sociological institutionalism 
adopt a self-consciously agnostic stance towards the efficiency or performance 
consequences of such national differences in the reception and transfer of the 
American model, other writers -  above all historical economists -  have no such 
reservations. For the latter school, the effective absorption of US mass-production 
technology, Taylorist or Fordist work organization, and systematic management 
methods -  regarded as the key to productivity catch-up -  depended in turn on 
complementary shifts in socio-economic institutions and practices, from wage 
bargaining and union structure to corporate organization, market regulation, and 
macroeconomic management. National institutional environments across Western 
Europe (and Japan) varied in their compatibility with a growth model based on the 
importation of American productive techniques, and the resulting differences are 
assigned a key part in explaining cross-national variations in economic 
performance during the postwar “golden age”. “In order to take full advantage of 
the adaptation of American technologies to European conditions”. Crafts and 
Toniolo insist, “business and trade union practices had to be adjusted accordingly.” 
Even if “the spread of the new productivity ideology.. .was universal”, they 
observe, “the speed and lasting impact of adaptation varied from country to 
country...”. 15 For Eichengreen, similarly, Institutions were not equally well 
adapted to the needs of growth in all European countries. Some, notably the UK 
and Ireland, failed to develop the relevant domestic institutions. Others, such as 
France and Italy, managed to do so only with delay....These different institutional 
responses go a fair way towards accounting for variations across countries and over 
time in European growth performance.10
Superimposed on these conflicting views of the extent and consequences of 
postwar Americanization is a crosscutting debate about the role of the United States 
and the Marshall Plan in the transfer and diffusion of productive models and 
techniques. For many authors, predominantly but by no means exclusively 
American, US initiatives such as the Marshall Plan, the technical assistance 
programs, and the policies of the German and Japanese occupation authorities were 
crucial in transferring managerial expertise and know-how, financing investment in 




























































































around productivity and economic growth across the Atlantic and the Pacific. For 
others, notably but not solely non-American, the primary impetus behind postwar 
reorganization of production and the introduction of new techniques and methods -  
including those borrowed from the United States -  came rather from the European 
and Japanese themselves, deriving its real power from national policies and 
domestic institutions, with the Marshall Plan and other US programs significant 
mainly at the margin.17 Here, too, much of the recent literature has sought to steer a 
middle course between these polarities, presenting the Marshall Plan and other US 
policies as an “important catalyst” rather than the driving force behind the postwar 
economic transformation of Western Europe and Japan; “not the fuel” but instead 
“the lubricant in [the] engine”, according to a slightly different metaphor. 
“Transfers of complex models”, argue Ove Bjamar and Matthias Kipping in their 
introduction to a recent edited volume on The Americanization o f European 
Business, “are likely to take place more effectively when an active exporter is faced 
with an active importer”; while for Djelic, similarly, the postwar success of the US 
authorities in exporting the American productive model depended on their relative 
ability in different countries to collaborate with institutionally powerful local elites 
in a cross-national modernization network.18 Most of the contributors to our project, 
however, go significantly further in emphasizing the active reworking and 
transformation of the American model in postwar European and Japanese industry. 
Modification and hybridization of US technology and management practices, on 
this view, should not be interpreted as a negative phenomenon, an index of 
domestic resistance to the transfer process, nor even as a sign of unavoidable 
compromises in adapting or “translating” the American model to fit local 
constraints, but rather as a positive source of experimentation, innovation, and 
learning for European and Japanese firms during the postwar era.'1'
Beneath this welter of contrasting historiographical interpretations, however, 
can be discerned a deeper set of theoretical differences about the nature of the 
“American model” and its transferability to other national settings. Although these 
differences will be examined here in the context of the literature on postwar 
Americanization, very similar theoretical oppositions and assumptions, as we shall 
see in section III, inform current debates about the international transfer and 
diffusion of productive models, whether from Japan or once again from the United 
States. With appropriate adjustments, therefore, the conceptual approach and 
historiographical critique developed here should prove more widely applicable.
A first axis of disagreement concerns whether the United States should be 
considered a unitary or heterogeneous model for European and Japanese industry. 




























































































essential features of the US model during this period: large, hierarchically managed 
corporations, using mass production and distribution techniques to compete in 
oligopolistic markets policed by antitrust regulation. Insofar as internal diversity 
within the US economy is acknowledged at all in such accounts, it is typically 
assimilated to the persistence of small and medium-sized firms in labour-intensive 
industries peripheral to what Alfred Chandler has termed “competitive managerial 
capitalism”.20 At the opposite pole are historians such as Alf Ludtke, Inge 
Marssolek, and Adelheid von Saldem, who emphasize instead the “polymorphous” 
multiplicity of competing representations of US economy and society which 
allowed European and Japanese observers to interpret and appropriate 
contemporary discourses of “Americanization” in contradictory ways according to 
their own subjective experiences, interests, and desires.21 Between these two 
extremes stand those, like the contributors to our project, who accept the idea of an 
“American model” with certain core characteristics as a contemporary historical 
construct, while at the same time calling attention to significant ambiguities, 
undercurrents, and disparities within US industrial practice, from which foreign 
visitors could accordingly draw a variety of lessons.
A second and closely related polarity regards the relationship between the 
constituent elements of the American model. For many writers on postwar 
Americanization, as we have seen, there was a close linkage not only among mass- 
production techniques and systematic management methods, but also between these 
and US forms of corporate organization, industrial relations, and market regulation. 
Though it could be applied to varying degrees in different settings, the American 
model, on this view, can best be understood as a coherent package of tightly- 
coupled elements characterized by a high degree of mutual complementarity. 
Another group of historians maintains by contrast that even the Americans 
themselves did not seek to market a single self-contained productive model, but 
instead offered a wide array of discrete stand-alone techniques from which 
European and Japanese industrialists could select the most useful and cost- 
effective, as if in a “sort of department store”, to cite Luciano Segreto’s evocative if 
exaggerated phrase.22 Here again, the participants in our project pursue an 
alternative path, highlighting both the deconstructibility of the American model and 
the interdependencies among its elements. Thus as a number of studies 
demonstrate, high-volume US manufacturing techniques and management tools 
such as standardization, automation, flow-line layout, mechanized materials 
handling, job evaluation, statistical quality control, training within industry, or 
time-and-motion study could be successfully introduced by European and Japanese 




























































































through careful adaptation and modification to fit with the other elements of their 
own production systems as well as the external environment.
A third contested issue involves the degree of universality or context- 
dependence of the American model. In a simple neoclassical world characterized 
by perfect information, competitive markets, and uniform factor supplies, a more 
efficient new technique will be rapidly adopted by all producers throughout the 
economy. Yet few if any historical commentators subscribe in practice to such a 
naive view. Thus Moses Abramovitz, one of the founders of the modem 
convergence approach, insists that productivity catch-up is not an automatic 
process, but depends on supplementary conditions such as “social capability” (a 
loosely-defined complex of national attributes, attitudes, and institutions favourable 
to the absorption of foreign innovations), natural resource endowments, and 
“technological congruence”: “the relevance or usefulness to less advanced 
countries of the techniques and forms of organization that characterize the frontiers 
of productivity in a leading economy.” Given the distinctive developmental path 
followed by the United States during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Abramovitz suggests, “countries less well endowed with natural resources and with 
smaller domestic markets could not easily adopt and exploit American 
technology”; only as resource disparities became less important, incomes rose, and 
markets became more integrated through foreign trade could Europe and Japan 
begin to catch up by emulating US production methods.23 Other writers in this 
tradition, as we have seen, place substantially greater emphasis on the economic, 
organizational, and institutional requirements for successful adoption and 
exploitation of American techniques and methods. Most of the contributors to our 
project would push this line of argument further to question how far market 
structures and institutions in Western Europe and Japan did in fact converge with 
those of the United States, and thus to what extent the conditions for technological 
congruence across these economies have ever fully obtained. Insofar as economic 
and institutional conditions in Europe and Japan continued to diverge from those in 
the US, local adaptations, alterations and hybridization of the American model, on 
this view, remained both necessary and desirable in theory as well as in practice. 
Only by being substantially modified or even transformed to fit a broader range of 
local circumstances, paradoxically, could this putatively universal productive 
model be widely diffused beyond its original economic and institutional context.
A fourth opposition centers on the extent of institutional plasticity or path 
dependence in the receiving countries. For some writers in the catch-up and 
convergence tradition, the institutional environments of postwar Western Europe 
and Japan were sufficiently plastic to permit extensive transfer of US techniques 




























































































tight coupling among their constituent elements. For others, by contrast, 
institutional environments, even more than technologies themselves, are highly 
path dependent, creating substantial barriers to the adoption of new production and 
growth models outside of extraordinary historical moments. “Socioeconomic 
institutions”, Eichengreen argues, necessarily displayed considerable inertia. Their 
function, in part, being to serve as coordinating mechanisms, their very nature 
created coordination problems for altering them. Institutions function as standards, 
giving rise to network externalities that tend to lock in their operation. The 
exceptional circumstances of war and reconstruction provided singular 
opportunities for coordinating wholesale adjustments in institutional arrangements. 
Even under these extraordinary conditions, however, radical changes in 
coordinating institutions were necessarily difficult to organize. Inevitably, the 
important institutional changes of the postwar period were only marginal 
adaptations. They were feasible only where considerable progress had already been 
made in developing the institutional structures required for growth after World War 
II.24
More typically, however, as we have seen, recent scholars have viewed the 
institutional environments of postwar Western Europe and Japan as both plastic 
enough to allow a significant transfer of US techniques and methods, and at the 
same time sufficiently path dependent to inhibit full convergence on the American 
model. Many of the contributors to this project would contest this polarity 
altogether, emphasizing the ways in which even quite stable institutional 
arrangements, like technologies and production models, may be reconfigured 
through apparently marginal modifications to operate quite differently under new 
environmental conditions. Thus continuing relationships or network ties between 
institutions may belie a deep transformation in the ways actors conceive of 
themselves, their mission, and their strategic possibilities, as we shall see for 
example, in the case of the German and Japanese steel industries before and after 
the Second World War. History, on this view, surely, matters, as in the path- 
dependency story; but its consequences may often be to facilitate rather than to 
obstruct economic adjustment by serving as a cognitive and practical resource for 
self-reflective actors in responding to external challenges -  without, however, 
leading to convergence around a single set of institutions, techniques, or practices.25
A fifth and perhaps most crucial line of theoretical cleavage concerns the 
underlying efficiency characteristics of the US model. For most writers on postwar 
Americanization, as we have seen, the US model of mass production and 
systematic management unambiguously represented a global productivity frontier, 




























































































performance, as most notably in the case of Britain.26 For most of the participants in 
our project, by contrast, US manufacturing techniques and management practices 
represented at best a more or less effective response to an historically specific set of 
environmental conditions, outside of which there could be no presumption they 
would prove equally successful. In a longer historical perspective, such as that 
adopted in this project, many core features of the American model would widely 
come to be seen as liabilities rather assets as the international environment became 
increasingly volatile from the 1970s onwards, while the individual studies , as we 
shall see, offer striking examples of the pitfalls resulting from excessive emulation 
of postwar US practice -  both technological and managerial -  under rapidly 
changing competitive circumstances. Deviations from the American model, on this 
view, need not result in inferior economic performance, but could instead give rise 
to incremental innovations which enhanced productivity and competitiveness, as is 
broadly acknowledged in the case of Japan.27 Synchronically, too, European and 
Japanese manufacturers might develop alternative technologies and production 
methods better adapted to their own circumstances but functionally equivalent or 
even superior in performance to that of their American counterparts, as for example 
in the case of Michelin and the radial tire revolution studied by Paul Erker.28
Based on various combinations of these underlying theoretical oppositions, 
the salient differences among the contending historiographical perspectives on 
postwar Americanization can be represented schematically as in table 1. The 
remainder of this section draws together and elaborates the conceptual approach to 
postwar Americanization pursued by the organizers of this project and shared to 
varying degrees by the other participants. In each case, as can be seen from table 1, 
the approach pursued in this project either reverses the dominant position within 
the historiography or rejects the theoretical opposition on which it is founded. Only 
by substantially modifying or abandoning altogether these widely-held theoretical 
assumptions about the nature and transferability of productive models, we contend, 
can the pervasive evidence of selective adaptation, creative modification, and 
innovative hybridization of US technology and management in postwar Europe and 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































“Americanization”, in our view, should be understood not as a neutral 
analytical concept but rather as a contested historical project, referring to the 
putative diffusion of an ensemble of interdependent characteristics, techniques, and 
practices -  from mass production and systematic management to corporate 
structure, oligopolistic competition, and antitrust policy -  which domestic and 
foreign commentators alike took to be distinctive features of mid-twentieth century 
US industry.29 Such contemporary definitions of an “American model” were far 
from arbitrary, often reflecting, as the studies in our project show, long 
acquaintance with and keen observation of US industrial reality stretching back 
well before the Second World War. These contemporary definitions, however, were 
by no means univocal, nor could they be, given the internal diversity and 
heterogeneity of industrial practice across the American economy at the time, 
which remained visible to attentive foreign visitors -  as to latter-day historians -  
not only in the surviving redoubts of speciality manufacture, but even in core mass- 
production sectors like motor vehicles.30 US industry, moreover, was by its very 
nature a moving target, as newer high-profile practices such as the creation of 
centralized corporate R&D laboratories and the application of government- 
sponsored “big science” to technology increasingly caught the eye of foreign 
observers, while public antitrust policy slalomed through a dizzying series of twists 
and turns from the 1910s through the 1950s in its stance towards competition, 
cooperation, and merger among rival firms.31 Different observers therefore 
interpreted the “American model” in varying ways, depending on their own 
perceptions, experiences, frames of reference, and not least their political and 
ideological relationship to the United States, drawing divergent conclusions about 
its substantive merits, ease of exportation, and applicability to European or 
Japanese circumstances.
Many contemporary actors, as several of the contributors to our project 
underline, thought of themselves as “modernizers” rather than “Americanizers”, or 
understood the latter in terms of the former. But others, as a number of our studies 
also document, contested this universal vision of industrial modernity in the name 
of economic and technological objections which cannot easily be discounted in 
retrospect: indeed, their warnings about the inflexibility of special-purpose 
equipment, the high overhead costs of bureaucratic management, the wasteful 
accumulation of buffer stocks and work-in-progress, and the restrictive impact of 
standardization on product innovation anticipated much of the critique of US 
manufacturing practice in comparison to that of the Japanese which became 
commonplace during the 1970s and 80s. Postwar strategic debates and decision­
making processes, it cannot be too strongly emphasized, were conducted under 




























































































in markets at home and abroad; about the trajectory of technological development 
for particular products and entire industries; about the institutional framework for 
business activity across individual nations, regional trading blocs, and the 
international economy as a whole. Even where visionary entrepreneurs and policy 
makers apparently succeeded in reshaping industries and markets through “self- 
fulfilling” bets on American-style mass-production technologies and supranational 
commercial integration -  as Matthias Kipping for instance suggests in his study of 
French steel users and producers -  the outcome does not thereby “prove right” their 
position against the doubts raised by contemporary critics. For the realization of the 
optimistic projections of rapid and steady expansion of demand which underlay 
these investment strategies depended in part on contingent developments beyond 
the full control of the relevant actors themselves, from the Korean War boom to the 
completion of the Treaty of Rome. Under somewhat different macroeconomic 
circumstances, growth of demand for steel and metalworking products might easily 
have proved subject to sharper cyclical fluctuations, leading to substantial 
underutilization of costly investments in high-throughput, high minimum-efficient- 
scale plant, as European and Japanese firms following similar strategies discovered 
to their chagrin during the 1970s.32
For just such reasons, as many of the studies in this project demonstrate, 
enthusiastic supporters and skeptical critics of the American model alike often 
sought to hedge against uncertainty and improve its fit with domestic markets and 
institutions through selective adaptation and modification of US techniques and 
methods, thereby giving rise to innovative hybrid forms of productive organization 
rooted in indigenous as well as imported practice. Crucial to such creative 
hybridization, paradoxically, was contemporary actors’ attentiveness to the close 
linkages between productive models and particular economic and institutional 
contexts, since as we shall see it was precisely those European and Japanese 
industrialists most acutely conscious of the distance separating domestic from US 
conditions who proved most aggressive and adept at deconstructing, modifying, 
and recombining elements of the American model for their own purposes. But this 
hybridization process, finally, was no one-way street, for in reworking US 
technology and management to suit local circumstances, postwar European and 
Japanese actors at the same time reinterpreted and reshaped their own practices and 





























































































IL AMERICAN ENGAGEMENTS: BEYOND TRANSFER AND DIFFUSION
The studies in our project are divided into two main groups. The first considers 
postwar efforts at exporting US industrial practice by public agencies and private 
enterprises respectively, highlighting the internal tensions and diversity among the 
would-be prophets of the American model. The second and larger group of studies 
examines the variety of European and Japanese engagements with US technology 
and management through a series of matched country cases focusing on key 
metalworking industries such as steel, motor vehicles, mechanical engineering, and 
electrical equipment, together with closely-allied sectors like rubber tires, 
electronics, and telecommunications. These sectors, it is widely agreed, lay at the 
heart of postwar reconstruction and economic growth in Western Europe and 
Japan, as well as of contemporary debates and struggles over industrial 
Americanization. The construction of US-designed wide strip mills, for example, 
were among the very largest new investment projects of the late 1940s and early 
50s, while the French and Italian steel and automobile industries, as the studies by 
Kipping, Ranieri, and Bigazzi show, absorbed a high proportion of Marshall Aid 
directed to these countries, and indeed to Western Europe as a whole.33 A more 
comprehensive survey of postwar Americanization would doubtless devote greater 
space and attention to light consumer goods like clothing and furniture, process 
industries like oil or chemicals, or services like finance and retailing, though 
individual chapters do consider European interactions with the US model in related 
sectors such as rubber products (Erker), telecommunications (Lipartito), and 
electricity supply (Glimstedt, Zeitlin), as well as artisanal firms and regional 
networks of small and medium-sized enterprises (McGlade). By focusing on a 
critical group of related sectors, however, the project more than makes up in 
analytical depth for any sacrifice in empirical breadth through the resulting 
opportunities for complex, multi-levelled comparisons and contrasts across 
industries, firms, and national economies.34
In chronological terms, too, the project’s coverage radiates outwards from a 
central core. Thus all of the studies focus on the key reconstruction years (1945- 
60), when European and Japanese engagements with the American model were at 
their most intense, though many go further in following the trajectory of 
enterprises, sectors, and national economies through the heyday of the long postwar 
boom which ended with the first oil shock of 1973-4. In nearly all cases, however, 
the contributors also find it necessary to look back in greater or lesser detail at the 
prewar period in order to understand how far national and company responses to 
Americanization were inspired by earlier engagements with Fordism, Taylorism, 




























































































postwar era itself. Many of the studies, finally, glance forward, if only briefly, to 
the crisis of mass production and resurgence of flexibility since the mid-1970s as a 
means of contextualizing the distinctive environment of the postwar years and 
assessing its influence on the strategic choices of the historical actors.
Such multiple, overlapping, and crosscutting chronological perspectives -  
together with associated techniques such as flashbacks, anticipations, and epilogues 
-  can also be understood as narrative strategies for challenging and subverting the 
unilinear, teleological presentation of postwar Americanization as progressive 
modernization which remains predominant in the existing literature. Like 
synchronic comparisons across firms, sectors, and countries, or the polyphony of 
multiple voices within a single text, the plurality of temporalities in this project 
contributes to what literary theorists Gary Saul Morson and Michael André 
Bernstein have termed “sideshadowing”: the narrative representation of action as a 
process of deliberative choice among an open (though not of course infinite) set of 
alternative possibilities, more than one of which might in fact have been realized. 
Morson and Bernstein counterpose sideshadowing narratives to those based on 
“foreshadowing” and “backshadowing”: the abuse of hindsight to recount events as 
if their outcome were predetermined and could be used to judge the choices of 
historical actors irrespective of what the latter could realistically have been 
expected to know at the time. Only by rigorously eschewing such fore and 
backshadowing narratives, we argue, can studies such as those prepared for this 
project hope to recover the decision-making horizon of contemporary actors and 
thereby arrive at genuinely historical accounts of postwar European and Japanese 
engagements with the American model.35
Exporting the American Model?
One obligatory point of departure for historical analysis of postwar 
Americanization is the perspective of the Americans themselves. Many accounts of 
postwar reconstruction, as we have seen, depict the US authorities as seeking to 
export a unitary and coherent “American model” to Western Europe and Japan. Yet 
such interpretations, as Jacqueline McGlade’s study demonstrates, gloss over the 
deep internal divisions, conflicting objectives, and shifting priorities within the US 
camp itself which magnified the ambiguities surrounding the American model and 
inhibited its transnational projection. US policy makers during the late 1940s and 
50s, McGlade argues, were divided between liberal and conservative 
internationalists whose “global developmentalist” and “strategic security” agendas 
coincided only briefly during the high tide of the Marshall Plan and the creation of 




























































































associated with the Committee for Economic Development who played a leading 
role in the European Recovery Program (ERP) on the one hand, and more 
conservative trade protectionists associated with organizations such as the National 
Association of Manufacturers and the National Industrial Conference Board who 
were also hostile to New Deal domestic policies on the other.36 The US occupation 
authorities in Germany and Japan, as Gary Herrigel observes, were similarly riven 
by internecine struggles between radical progressive trustbusters, often linked to 
the Republican Party, and “New Dealer” advocates of American-style oligopolistic 
big business and mass production, as well as between both of these groups and 
conservative stabilizers more concerned with economic revival and internal order 
than with democratic institutional reform.37
Not only were the would-be exporters of the American model themselves 
deeply divided, but the international priorities pursued by US policy makers also 
shifted repeatedly in reaction to changing domestic political alignments and 
external challenges. Thus the US Technical Assistance and Productivity Program 
(USTA&P), as McGlade shows, was initially created in response to a conservative 
backlash against the Marshall Planners’ attempts to encourage broad-based 
recovery, industrial modernization, and democratic reform of West European 
economies in the context of mounting Cold War tensions. As military preparedness, 
rearmament, and containing Communism became increasingly prominent among 
US foreign economic policy goals during the 1950s, the USTA&P’s original aim to 
boost European industrial output through a massive transfer of American business 
practices and production methods gradually gave way to more narrowly targetted 
and less directive assistance to defence manufacturers holding off-shore 
procurement contracts.
Alongside these internal divisions and shifting priorities ran parallel spatial 
and temporal variations in the scope, modalities, and effectiveness of American 
influence. Only in directly occupied territories like West Germany and Japan, as 
Herrigel notes, could the US deploy coercive power to reshape industrial structure, 
economic institutions, and market order in conformity with American normative 
ideals. But even there, as he also demonstrates, the externally-imposed reforms 
were progressively modified in key details by domestic authorities, and exerted 
their deepest long-term impact by creating conditions within which local actors 
could revise their own self-understanding and practices in ways that ultimately 




























































































Elsewhere in Western Europe, despite the evident power conferred by the 
United States’ enormous military and economic resources, American influence on 
postwar reconstruction could be exercised principally through varying 
combinations of negotiation, persuasion, and voluntary emulation. US leverage 
might appear to have been greatest over financially weak countries like France and 
Italy which were particularly dependent on American aid. But as Chiarella Esposito 
has documented elsewhere, US authorities’ reluctance to bring down fragile centrist 
coalitions in these strategically critical nations by withholding conditional aid 
drastically curtailed their ability to insist on policies opposed by domestic 
governments, such as macroeconomic expansion in Italy or increased expenditure 
on low-cost housing and financial stabilization to contain inflation in France.38 
American support and Marshall Aid were most effective in providing approved 
domestic actors with the additional financial and political resources needed to 
implement their own strategic visions, as Matthias Kipping argues in the case of 
Jean Monnet, René Damien (Usinor), Pierre Lefaucheux (Renault), the French 
continuous strip mill installations, and the opening of the domestic steel market to 
competition through the ratification of the Schuman Plan. Even in such instances, 
however, as Ruggero Ranieri shows in a marvellous piece of historical detective 
work, there was often a plurality of conflicting views among US advisors and 
policy makers at different levels, so that only by mobilizing an extraordinary 
coalition including American engineering consultants, steelmakers, and equipment 
suppliers as well as Fiat could Finsider’s Oscar Sinigalia succeed in overcoming 
the combined opposition of the World Bank, local Marshall Plan officials, Italian 
private steel companies, and other prominent US industrialists and consultants to 
the construction of a new integrated wide-strip mill complex at Comigliano on the 
Genoese coast.39
American negotiating leverage over domestic economic and industrial 
policies during the Marshall Plan era was weakest, finally, in the case of more 
politically and financially independent Social Democratic nations such as Britain, 
Norway, and Sweden. Thus the British and Norwegian Labour governments 
insulated their ambitious capital investment policies from US interference by using 
counterpart funds mainly to retire public debt, while carefully devolving 
responsibility for collaboration with the American-led productivity drive to 
bipartite union-management bodies outside direct state control. Sweden, which 
remained politically neutral, created no counterpart fund at all because her Social 





























































































Chronologically, too, US authorities’ capacity to promote the transfer and 
diffusion of the American model to Western Europe and Japan moved through 
several distinct phases during the postwar reconstruction period. US direct 
influence over the European and Japanese economies reached its zenith during the 
immediate postwar years of military occupation and massive foreign aid, but began 
to fall off by the early 1950s with the onset of large-scale rearmament and the 
ascendancy of strategic concerns with Communist containment. Overt American 
hegemony declined still further during the late 1950s with the increasingly 
autonomous decision-making role assumed by European governments in 
multilateral institutions such as the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation and the European Productivity Agency (EPA), and the gradual 
reintegration of both Japan and West Germany into the international community. 
During this latter period, as McGlade comments, initiative in the planning and 
usage of US aid and technical assistance passed increasingly into the hands of 
European actors who creatively adapted it for their own reform purposes rather 
than mechanically seeking to convert domestic manufacturing into a mirror image 
of the American model; and similar if perhaps less sweeping observations could 
also be made about the productivity movement in Japan, which has been termed 
“America’s star pupil”.41 Few national productivity centers long survived the 
dissolution of the EPA in 1961, while even those countries such as West Germany, 
Japan, or Britain, which had enacted antimonopoly legislation under US pressure in 
the late 1940s, as Herrigel among others shows, deviated significantly from the 
American antitrust paradigm during the 1950s and 60s.42 Attempts to 
institutionalize the transfer of the American model in Western Europe and Japan 
thus proved largely unsuccessful, leaving the enduring influence of US industrial 
practice dependent primarily on conversion and voluntary emulation, and hence 
ultimately on its interpretation, adaptation, and modification by local actors.43
But public policies such as the Marshall Plan, the USTA&P, and 
decartellization comprised only one side of contemporary American efforts to 
transform European and Japanese industry in their own image. Private business 
enterprises such as capital equipment suppliers, consultancies, and final goods 
manufacturers also played an important and growing part in the attempted transfer 
of US techniques and methods through a variety of channels from machinery sales, 
contractual advice, and patent licencing to technical cooperation agreements, joint 
ventures, and foreign direct investment. Thus in nearly every case considered in 
this project, European and Japanese manufacturers acquired American technical 
know-how in embodied form during the postwar reconstruction years by ordering 
machinery and capital equipment from US suppliers, often but by no means 




























































































Comigliano complex, Simca’s Nanterre automobile factory, or Nissan’s Oppama 
works, European and Japanese companies employed US engineering consultants 
and equipment suppliers to design, layout, and even install entire plants. Other 
companies like Volvo brought in American consultants to implement new payment 
and work-study systems such as MTM (Methods-Time-Measurement), while 
Finsider, as Ranieri details, worked closely with US steel companies and 
management consultants to import not only technological know-how but also 
budgeting, planning, and standard costing methods, as well as supervisory training, 
job analysis, and job evaluation. Many European and Japanese firms in sectors such 
as steel, rubber, automobiles, and electronics likewise purchased manufacturing 
licences to patented American products and processes either for their own use or to 
service a geographically delimited market, and such arrangements typically 
included fees for technical assistance and information as well as a pure royalty 
component. Not all technical cooperation agreements, however, involved cash 
payments, since well-established European companies like Fiat or Continental 
possessed sufficient research, design, production, and marketing expertise of their 
own to place them on a more or less equal footing with US partners such as 
Chrysler, Goodyear, or General Tire. More rarely, as in the case of Phoenix- 
Gummiwerke and Firestone Tire & Rubber, such transatlantic collaboration could 
extend as far as the marketing of jointly-branded goods and a US equity stake in the 
partner company, leading to more rapid and intense know-how transfer, but also as 
Paul Erker points out, to a risky and eventually dangerous dependence on American 
products and technology.44
A striking feature of industrial Americanization during the early postwar 
period is the comparatively limited impact of US management consultancies, 
especially in larger European countries such as Britain, France, and West Germany. 
In each of these markets, as Matthias Kipping has suggested elsewhere, US 
consultancy firms made little inroad during the 1940s and 50s both because of the 
prior existence of domestic service providers apparently able to meet the needs of 
local clients, and because of their own relative failure to adapt the American model 
to indigenous corporate structures and management styles. It was only during the 
1960s that US management consultancies, notably McKinsey & Co., established a 
major role for their overseas operations in transferring the multidivisional form of 
corporate organization to large British and to a lesser extent French and West 
German companies. Even then, however, as a growing historical literature shows, 
the multidivisional structure was often implemented in incomplete, “corrupted”, or 
modified form, especially in Britain, while an important group of West German 




























































































the M-Form at all, or returned to older functional and holding company structures 
during the 1970s.45
In each of these cases, whatever the eventual outcome, US consultants and 
manufacturers functioned primarily as brokers or intermediaries in the attempted 
transfer of American techniques and methods, responding to initiatives from 
European client firms and/or US public authorities. The major exception to this 
pattern is of course foreign direct investment by US multinational companies, the 
eye of the resurgent storm over the “American challenge” to European business 
during the 1960s.46 Surely it is to such companies if anywhere that we should look 
for robust, coherent, and successful efforts at transplanting the American model? 
Although historical research on this crucial question is still in its preliminary 
stages,47 Steven Tolliday’s study of the European operations of US multinational 
automobile firms yields some surprising answers.48 Even the “Big Three” auto 
makers themselves did not fully conform to a single American model: thus the Ford 
Motor Company itself had to be comprehensively reorganized with the assistance 
of ex-General Motors managers during the late 1940s to repair the damages 
inflicted by the latter days of its founder’s rule before it could begin to tackle the 
problems of rebuilding the company’s various European subsidiaries. And even 
once Ford had ostensibly embraced GM’s principles of managerial decentralization 
and divisional autonomy, the former continued to diverge from the latter in its 
greater functional centralization and stronger orientation towards the pursuit of 
production economies of scale through automation and plant integration.40 Nor did 
it prove an easy task to integrate and coordinate Ford’s separate British, French, 
and German companies, each of which had its own distinct products, production 
facilities, distribution networks, and management strategies, especially since trade 
barriers, government policies, and variations in competitive conditions continued to 
fragment European automobile markets even after the creation of the EEC. Under 
these conditions, as Jonathan Zeitlin also shows in the case of Britain, adjustment 
of US mass-production methods to the size and structure of domestic markets, 
including the development of distinctive local designs and the use of intermediate 
technological solutions for accommodating shorter runs and more frequent 
changeovers, gradually became a distinctive feature of both Ford and GM’s 
postwar European operations (with the partial but significant exception of Ford- 
France, which was sold to Simca in 1954). Even during the late 1950s and early 
60s, proposals by Ford-International to achieve European-wide economies of scale 
through cross-national harmonization of model planning and commonization of 
components ran into fierce opposition not only from the management of its British 
and German companies, but also from its own central marketing staff. In many 




























































































multinational auto companies often found themselves running third- or fourth-rate 
European subsidiaries and struggling to establish effective managerial control from 
Detroit, while European manufacturers such as Volkswagen, Fiat, Renault, and 
even for a time Simca surpassed the masters in finding ways to adapt, develop, and 
reinterpret American practice to suit domestic markets and conditions.50
Reworking US Technology and Management: National, Sectoral, and Firm- 
Level Variations
European and Japanese responses to postwar efforts at exporting the American 
model and their engagements with US technology and management can be 
analyzed at a number of different levels. Painting with a broad brush, the countries 
considered in this project may be grouped into three related pairs, as reflected in the 
organization of the chapters, based on their degree of political and financial 
autonomy from the United States, their economic and technological self- 
confidence, and the enthusiasm of key decision-makers in business and government 
for emulation of the American model. Each of these axes of variation can in turn be 
further specified. We have already seen how the forms and extent of US influence 
on domestic policy varied across militarily-occupied territories like Japan and West 
Germany, financially weak but strategically critical countries like France and Italy 
governed by fragile centrist coalitions, and more politically and economically 
independent Social Democratic nations like Britain and Sweden. Such differences 
can be clearly observed, for example, in the relative importance of Marshall Aid: 
thus in 1948-9, as Milward has shown, net ERP aid as a proportion of national 
income ranged from 6.5 percent in France and 5.3 percent in Italy to 2.9 percent in 
Western Germany, 2.4 percent in Britain, and 0.3 percent in Sweden.51
A key dimension of national economic and technological self-confidence is 
the degree of industrial backwardness relative to the United States in the minds of 
domestic engineers, managers, and government officials, which was arguably 
greatest in the cases of France, Italy, and from some points of view Japan, but least 
in those of Britain, Sweden, and Germany. Another important element is the 
intensity and continuity of interactions with American industry before 1945. Here 
the UK was clearly in a class of its own, as Anglo-American economic cooperation 
and technological exchange deepened substantially during the war, in contrast to 
hostile powers such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, which had already moved 
towards autarky in the late 1930s, or occupied countries like France, whose 
industrial contacts with the US were largely cut off after 1940. More elusive but no 
less significant is the extent of domestic industrialists’ faith in the competitive 



























































































capabilities. Here the Japanese, with their long and proud tradition of modifying 
and improving imported technologies, arguably stood closer to the British, Swedes, 
and Germans than to the Italians or the French , though even in the latter cases, as 
the studies by Bigazzi and Kipping show, the creativity and self-reliance of 
domestic engineers and managers should not be underestimated.52
The intersection of these axes of variation shaped the relative strength of 
domestic commitment to and enthusiasm for emulation of the American model. 
Britain and Sweden on the one hand and France and Italy on the other could thus be 
located at opposite ends of an international spectrum of postwar responses to 
industrial Americanization. The position of West Germany and Japan on this 
continuum is complicated by the disjunction between their dependent status as 
occupied powers, which unlike the former permitted the external imposition of far- 
reaching changes in industrial structure and market order, and their autonomous 
technological style and innovative capabilities, which made them more critical and 
selective in the reception of US practice than the latter.53
Such overarching generalizations must be immediately qualified by a 
recognition of the multiplicity of actors and their divergent stances towards 
Americanization within each country itself. In Italy, for example, both the Christian 
Democratic-dominated government and the peak business association 
Confindustria were actively hostile to the Marshall Planners’ self-consciously 
progressive efforts to promote mass consumption and union-management 
cooperation, while both bodies remained lukewarm at best towards the USTA&P 
and the National Productivity Center (Comitato nazionale per la produttività) until 
the latter’s reorientation in the mid-1950s towards the organization of management 
education courses and the provision of financial assistance to small and medium­
sized firms. It was only the alliance between public-sector technocrats from the 
great state holding companies 1RI (Instituto per la ricostruzione industriale) and 
AGIP (Azienda generale italiana petroli), big private industrial companies such as 
Fiat, and their supporters within the governing parties, that ensured the use of a 
substantial proportion of Marshall Aid funds to support large-scale investments in 
American-style mass-production technologies. But serialization of production and 
the assimilation of US high-volume methods in Italy were not confined to large 
public and private enterprises: as Duccio Bigazzi points out, a significant body of 
smaller firms manufacturing consumer-orientated products like typewriters, sewing 
machines, motor scooters, and domestic electrical appliances also took great strides 




























































































In most European countries, the postwar productivity drive raised sensitive 
and contentious questions about the role of the state in private industrial decision­
making which aroused mistrust and even hostility among business interest 
organizations. Business spokesmen returning from transatlantic study missions 
expressed open reservations about the domestic applicability of American 
manufacturing techniques and management methods not only in Britain and Italy 
but also in France, where their peak association, the Conseil national du patronat 
français (CNPF), like the Federation of British Industries (FBI), was officially 
committed to the US-sponsored productivity program and directly involved in the 
administration of ERP counterpart funds.55 In most countries, too, including France, 
Britain, West Germany, and Japan, both peak and sectoral trade associations 
staunchly opposed actual or proposed antitrust legislation inspired by the American 
model, and fought with varying degrees of success during the 1950s against 
statutory prohibitions of cartel arrangements.56
In France and Italy, the trade-union movement split after 1947 into a 
Communist-led majority wing, which was politically and ideologically hostile to 
Americanization and the official productivity drive (while often sharing a similar 
underlying vision of technological advance), and a Social Democratic/Catholic 
minority wing, which was initially sympathetic to the idea of plant-level 
cooperation for productivity improvement, but became progressively disillusioned 
by management’s unwillingness to negotiate over the distribution of the ensuing 
benefits. In Britain, as in West Germany, the unitary trade-union confederation 
actively supported the postwar productivity drive and associated US study 
missions. So, too, did most of its constituent organizations, despite criticisms from 
the left-wing Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions of the Labour 
government’s unwillingness to make factory-level Joint Production Committees 
compulsory or to give tripartite consultative bodies an effective role in industrial 
planning. In Sweden, as Henrik Glimstedt’s study shows, the Metalworkers’ Union, 
like the Engineering Employers’ Association, initially opposed the introduction of 
MTM at Volvo both as a violation of industry-wide collective bargaining 
agreements and as an undesirable deviation from domestic standards of good 
engineering practice, but eventually negotiated a compromise solution over the 
objections of the Communist-majority factory club in the face of company 
managers’ evident determination to impose the new payment system. In Japan, as 
Herrigel observes, blue-collar workers, foremen and enterprise unions during the 
1950s pushed steel plant managers to modify imported US job evaluation and 
statistical quality control methods to balance merit assessment with seniority in 
wage payment and to diffuse responsibility from centralized engineering bureaux to 




























































































As in the case of the American model itself, the emergence of broad national 
patterns in postwar European and Japanese engagements with US technology and 
management could thus go hand in hand with significant interpretative ambiguities 
and finer-grained variations among domestic actors within each country.58 The 
most important such variations for our purposes, on which the studies for our 
project largely concentrate, are those between individual sectors and firms.59 In 
Britain, for example, as Zeitlin notes, component manufacturers saw greater scope 
for reduction of product variety than did makers of capital equipment and consumer 
goods, while several of the most ambitious postwar experiments with 
standardization and mass production were undertaken by nationalized enterprises 
such as the railways or the electricity supply authorities. In France and Italy, as 
Kipping and Ranieri show, a major impetus to the expansion of steelmaking 
capacity, the importation of American strip-mill technology, and the opening of the 
domestic market to greater competition came from the user industries, especially 
but not exclusively automobile manufacturers. In Sweden, as Glimstedt 
demonstrates, the motor vehicle and electrical engineering industries followed 
opposite trajectories during the 1950s and 60s. Thus Volvo moved towards volume 
production of standardized passenger cars in response to government restrictions on 
demand for its main heavy truck business and the opening of the domestic 
automobile market to foreign imports. ASEA conversely used the income stream 
from light, mass-produced “bread-and-butter” lines such as meters and small 
motors to finance a move into more complex and technologically sophisticated 
heavy equipment such as transformers, circuit breakers, and High Voltage Direct 
Current distribution systems in collaboration with its major customer, the Swedish 
State Power Board.60
Within a single industrial sector, as the studies for this project reveal, there 
could often be sharp differences in strategic approaches to Americanization and 
mass production among rival enterprises. Thus, as Ranieri describes, the Italian 
steel industry in the late 1940s and early 50s was bitterly divided between public- 
sector managers led by Sinigalia on the one hand, who wanted to build giant 
integrated coastal works capable of turning out vast quantities of sheet steel for 
nascent mass manufacturers of consumer durables, and private-sector industrialists 
led by Falck on the other, who wanted instead to concentrate investment on more 
flexible plants capable of serving diversified final markets, even at the cost of 
importing cheap semi-finished ingots from other European countries. In France, as 
Kipping likewise details, François de Wendel, the largest Lorraine steel magnate, 
initially denounced Usinor’s continuous strip mill plans as a “crazy” venture “not 
suitable for the conditions of the French market”, and could only be induced to 




























































































State Planning Commission (Commissariat général du plan) but also from Renault, 
which credibly threatened to acquire a semi-continuous mill for its own 
steelmaking subsidiary. Nor was there any necessary or uniform connection 
between public enterprise and support for Americanization: as Bigazzi documents, 
Pasquale Gallo, interim CEO of the state-owned Alfa Romeo, argued immediately 
after the war that the Italian automobile industry could aspire to nothing more than 
“organized craftsmanship” based on short-series quality production, while Vittorio 
Valletta of the privately-owned Fiat defended his company’s measured but 
determined drive towards mass production based on expanding volumes of small, 
cheap cars and the exploitation of scale economies.61
In Britain, as Zeitlin points out, pronounced variations in managerial strategy 
could be observed between a firm like Standard Motors, which staked its postwar 
fortunes on high-volume output of standardized cars and tractors using a single 
interchangeable engine for both types of vehicle, and other domestic automotive 
manufacturers such as Austin, Morris, Leyland, or Rover, which maintained more 
diversified model ranges while selectively modifying US-style mass-production 
methods to accommodate greater product variety and smaller quantities. It the 
West German rubber tire industry, as we have already seen, Phoenix and 
Continental pursued contrasting approaches to cooperation with US companies, as 
the former committed itself to a long-term dependent relationship with Firestone, 
while the latter remained careful to preserve its technological and commercial 
autonomy in successive partnerships with General Tire and Goodyear. In Japan, 
similarly, Nissan and Toyota after as before the war followed opposed routes to the 
mastery of Western mass-production methods, with the former focusing on 
imported technology and licencing agreements with foreign manufacturers, while 
the latter relied instead, as Kazuo Wada and Takao Shiba show, on independent 
adaptation of American techniques and borrowing of organizational practices from 
other domestic industries like textile machinery, aircraft, and shipbuilding.62
Even inside a single firm or enterprise group, finally, conflicting attitudes 
towards the benefits of Americanization could on occasion precipitate fierce 
struggles between managers and engineers at different levels. Thus within IRI, for 
example, as Ranieri observes, Ilva managers remained much less enthusiastic than 
their Finsider counterparts about US technology and management, including wide 
strip mills, open-hearth converters, standard costing, statistical planning and 
budgeting, while the differences between these groups persisted even after the two 
companies were merged into Italsider at the beginning of the 1960s. Within Volvo, 
similarly, as Glimstedt shows, car and truck manufacturing continued to be 




























































































engineers hostile to the wholesale adoption of mass-production methods were 
forced out of the passenger car division in the late 1950s, only to be recalled during 
the mid-1960s to assist in overcoming mounting quality problems with its 
vehicles.63
History and Hybridization
A central theme of this project is that of proactivity. European and Japanese 
industrialists did not wait passively after the end of the Second World War for 
enlightenment about the American efficiency gospel from Marshall Plan 
evangelists nor for invitations to participate in productivity missions to the US. 
More influential and significant in many cases than the public missions organized 
by national productivity centers were the private American study trips organized by 
leading firms such as Lucas, Renault, Peugeot, Thomson, Fiat, Alfa Romeo, 
Finsider, Continental, Phoenix, or Toyota, often involving repeated visits by 
managers and engineers at different levels over a period of several years. Still more 
striking are the images of American dreams in occupied France delineated by 
Kipping, with Renault engineers secretly developing the 4CV and a new type of 
modular transfer machine, Peugeot managers clandestinely ordering US machine 
tools, and the Vichy Organization Committees (Comités d ’organisation) in steel 
and motor vehicles formulating plans for postwar installation of high-throughput 
strip mills on the one hand and a drastic rationalization of models and 
standardization of components on the other.64
European and Japanese manufacturers could be so proactive in engaging the 
US model precisely because Americanization was far from a new issue for them 
after 1945. Fordism, Taylorism, and the “American System of Manufactures” had 
already begun to attract widespread foreign interest before the First World War, 
while public debates about them took on new cultural and political as well as 
economic urgency during the 1920s as US mass-produced goods and investment 
capital Hooded into international markets. In Europe and Japan alike, industrialists 
and engineers closely monitored the evolution of US mass-production techniques 
and systematic management methods, heatedly discussed their applicability to 
domestic economic and institutional conditions, and sought with varying degrees of 
ambition and success to transplant into their home soil elements of the American 
model.65 Many European and Japanese manufacturers, as the studies in this project 
document, also had extensive prewar contacts with US industry through a 
multiplicity of channels from study visits, equipment purchases, and consultancy 
contracts to product licencing, technological cooperation agreements, joint 




























































































Nor was the United States the only foreign point of reference for European 
and Japanese industrialists during the 1940s and 50s. A significant countercurrent 
to postwar Americanization was the re-evaluation of Germany as an alternative 
economic and technological as well as political and cultural model. Tn many cases, 
not surprisingly, the outcome of the war induced a sharp reaction against German 
industrial practice even among its most ardent erstwhile admirers. Thus Sinigalia, 
as Ranieri details, explicitly saw Americanization of the Italian steel industry as a 
rejection of the prewar German model based on vertical intrafirm linkages between 
Thomas converters and small, flexible rolling mills turning out a wide array of low- 
volume products marketed under cartel agreements. In engineering, similarly, as 
Bigazzi observes, Italian manufacturers turned back to the US after 1945 as their 
main external source of technological and organizational know-how after an 
intense -  and in his view fruitful -  period of engagement with large German 
enterprises during the late 1930s and early 40s. The depth to which German 
industrial prestige had sunk in British eyes can be gauged from the plant visit 
reports of postwar intelligence missions: despite grudging respect for the skills and 
training of the workforce, UK engineers and managers, as Zeitlin notes, found 
“very little to learn” in terms of production methods or internal organization from 
their major prewar competitors in many metalworking sectors. In other cases, 
however, the eclipse of German influence was less extreme. In Japan, for example, 
as Wada and Shiba demonstrate, the “takt” or “rhythm” system and other modified 
flow-line methods adapted from German aircraft manufacturers during the 1940s 
were carried into leading postwar metalworking assembly industries such as 
shipbuilding, cameras, and automobiles by domestic efficiency engineers with 
experience in wartime production.66 In France, too, despite the postwar ascendancy 
of American technology and management models. Patrick Fridenson has argued 
that expatriated German engineers and scientists “played an important part, and 
sometimes a key role, in the modernization of major branches such as the 
automobile, chemical, aluminium and professional electronics industries”.67
The wartime productive achievements and postwar commercial ascendancy 
of US industry thus rekindled longstanding sparks of attraction to the American 
model in Europe and Japan, while dimming if not altogether extinguishing interest 
in alternative national paradigms. Yet internal disparities and ambiguities within 
American industry meant that the US model did not always offer clearcut lessons 
even to its most enthusiastic would-be imitators. British civil servants and 
telecommunications engineers, as Kenneth Lipartito shows, greatly admired the US 
Bell System and sought to learn from its achievements in reforming domestic 




























































































system should the British emulate: centralized corporate research and vertical 
integration of equipment design and manufacturing; universal service and the rapid 
expansion of network demand through low-cost flat-rate pricing; or the broader 
antitrust paradigm of arms-length competitive relations among suppliers? Each of 
these features of the “American model”, as Lipartito argues, pointed in different 
directions and carried divergent implications for the restructuring of British 
telecommunications, while oscillation between efforts at rationalization along Bell 
lines and contrary attempts to promote increased competition proved highly 
damaging in his judgement.68
Visitors from different countries might also draw opposite conclusions from 
the same observations. Both British and Italian engineers, as Zeitlin and Bigazzi 
each comment, were surprised by the large quantities of materials and work-in- 
progress they encountered in postwar US automobile and metalworking factories. 
But whereas the British and later the Japanese rejected such multiplication of buffer 
stocks as a wasteful deviation from good manufacturing practice, the Italians 
accepted it as a necessary sacrifice for the attainment of higher production volumes 
which was further justified by the greater complexity of product variations handled 
by US factories. The Japanese in particular often seized upon US practices and 
ideas which were either neglected or becoming obsolete in their original setting, 
such as quick die-change equipment for stamping presses, mixed-model assembly, 
or the preventative and participatory approach to quality control management 
associated with Deming, Juran, and Feigenbaum.69
Determined efforts to emulate American practice under sharply different 
product market and factor supply conditions could lead European and Japanese in 
technologically conservative as well as innovative directions. Both Fiat and 
Volkswagen managers, for example, were extremely cautious in automating their 
production operations during this period, with the latter in particular waiting until 
they were sure the market would absorb the additional output before introducing 
Detroit-style transfer equipment first in body manufacture and then in the 
mechanical departments.70 In Japan, too, as Wada and Shiba note, companies like 
Canon abandoned their relatively successful “work center” systems, an indigenous 
analogue to cellular manufacturing, in favour of dedicated automation and 
conveyor assembly during the late 1950s as output volumes reached minimum 
efficient scale for American-style mass production. In Italy, where the size and 
composition of future steel demand remained highly uncertain, Finsider hedged its 
bets by opting for a semi-continuous but upgradable wide strip mill at Comigliano 
which could also turn out ship plate if sales of auto body sheet proved 




























































































more powerful continuous strip mills but with less up-to-date capacity 
specifications and plant layouts.71
In some cases, too, uncritical imitation of foreign practice without sufficient 
appreciation of its potential limitations in different organizational and 
environmental contexts could yield highly deleterious results. Thus, as Zeitlin 
observes, British public-sector attempts during the late 1940s to standardize steam 
locomotives and turbo-alternators slowed down the introduction of more powerful 
and efficient alternatives, raising rather than reducing operating costs in the longer 
term as contemporary critics had forewarned. In the private sector, too. Standard 
Motors’ postwar use of a common engine in its Ferguson tractor and medium-size 
Vanguard car compromised the latter’s export market success as competing models 
became more widely available. In telecommunications, similarly, Lipartito 
contends that American-inspired efforts by British Post Office administrators 
during the 1950s and 60s to promote both competitive tendering and consolidation 
among equipment suppliers disrupted established patterns of coordination between 
technology, manufacturing, and the network without putting in place a coherent 
market alternative, thereby contributing to development delays and eventual 
commercial failure of its System X digital switching project. In the Italian steel 
industry, as Ranieri points out, American management tools such as job analysis, 
job evaluation, and standard costing, which had worked reasonably well at 
Comigliano, became ineffective and even counterproductive when extended to the 
much bigger workforce and more diverse plants of Italsider, a vast merged 
corporation whose centralized functional organization was closely modelled on that 
of US Steel. The huge new coastal plant complex built at Taranto in southern Italy 
during the 1960s, like its contemporary French counterpart at Fos-sur-Mer near 
Marseille, proved both too large and too inflexible to cope successfully with the 
turmoil in world markets during the 1970s. though Taranto’s internal problems also 
stemmed from Italsider managers’ misreading of the Japanese model, which had 
begun to displace the US steel industry as an international yardstick of best 
practice. In the rubber industry, finally, as Erker argues, over-reliance on the 
technological and commercial judgement of US manufacturers of fabric-breaker 
tires inhibited German companies from appreciating and responding to the 
challenge ot innovative steel-belted radial designs developed by Michelin in 
France, a fatal error in the case of Phoenix and very nearly so in that of Continental 
as well.
Often, however, European and Japanese industrialists’ prior familiarity with 
American-style practices, whether through direct contact or domestic analogy, 




























































































imitated wholesale, but rather as a suggestive point of departure for selective 
adaptation, creative modification, and innovative hybridization. Thus European 
automobile manufacturers such as Volkswagen, Renault, Citroen, Fiat, and BMC 
all developed original small car designs far removed from those of their US 
counterparts during the 1940s and 50s in order to reach mass sales in countries 
whose lower per capita incomes, higher fuel prices, shorter driving distances, more 
limited highway networks, and differential motoring taxation regimes held down 
demand for larger cars with powerful engines. Production engineers at 
Austin/BMC, as Zeitlin shows, developed novel types of transfer equipment based 
on standard modular units which could be easily reconfigured to cope with periodic 
design changes or even wholly new models, unlike contemporary “Detroit 
automation”.72 Both British and Japanese motor vehicle firms, as Zeitlin and Wada 
and Shiba describe, modified Fordist flow-line methods to handle greater product 
variety and shorter runs through practices such as quick tooling changes, mixed- 
model assembly, multiskilling, and functional flexibility, while likewise 
introducing innovative systems of production control and just-in-time logistics 
aimed at minimizing internal buffer stocks and work-in-progress. Japanese 
metalworking, steel and engineering companies also transformed US statistical 
quality control and job modification techniques by diffusing them from supervisors 
and specialist staff to groups of shop-floor workers.
In Sweden, as Glimstedt demonstrates, Volvo integrated US volume 
manufacturing methods such as MTM with indigenous traditions of high value- 
added craft production, socio-technical approaches to work organization, and 
pragmatic union-management relations to carve out an international market niche 
based on a distinctive new class of vehicle: safe, high-quality, but relatively 
inexpensive station wagons. Italian manufacturers of sewing machines, typewriters, 
motor scooters, and domestic electrical appliances, as Bigazzi points out, fused 
indigenous wartime experience of new processes and materials with imported 
American techniques and methods to reconcile low-cost serial production with a 
wide range of colors, a variety of shapes, and frequent adjustments in design. In 
West Germany, Herrigel argues that the revised antitrust law of 1957, which 
deviated from the American occupation statute by permitting rationalization cartels, 
smoothed the path of steel firms’ adjustment to the emergence of excess capacity in 
the late 1960s through the formation of distribution syndicates for the allocation of 
their finished products, which then facilitated a recombination of assets and 
increased specialization within the industry. At plant level, too, the codetermination 
system which emerged from the postwar encounter between American pluralist 
ideals and German unions’ challenge to capitalist property rights turned out to 




























































































gave domestic steel companies far greater flexibility within high-volume 
production than their US counterparts.
Sometimes the innovations resulting from European and Japanese 
hybridization of US practices in turn became the basis for imitation and reverse 
learning by the Americans themselves. During the late 1950s and early 60s, for 
example, the “Big Three” auto firms brought out “compact” car models of their 
own in a partially successful effort to repel the invasion of their own home market 
by smaller European designs. Both Ford and GM likewise introduced “building 
block” or “unitized” transfer lines with a family resemblance to those developed by 
French and British manufacturers in response to the “horsepower race” of the mid- 
1950s and the premature obsolescence of tightly-integrated automated facilities like 
the former’s celebrated Cleveland engine plant.73 During the 1980s, as Erker 
observes, Continental used its lead in the assimilation of French radial tire 
technology first to instruct and eventually to take over altogether its former US 
partner General Tire. But undoubtedly the most conspicuous example of this 
phenomenon is the take-up in the United States and other Western countries over 
the past two decades of Japanese manufacturing practices such as quality circles, 
just-in-time logistics, teamworking, continuous improvement, and collaborative 
supplier relations.74
Not all modifications of American practice, however, proved equally 
successful. At Usinor, for example, the productive efficiency of the new continuous 
strip mill installation arguably suffered, as Kipping suggests, from the physical 
separation of the hot and cold-rolling facilities and the failure to adopt an integrated 
organization structure with more elaborate budgeting and control procedures, 
choices motivated at least in part by a desire to maintain the autonomy of the 
original family owners within the merged company, as well as to avoid excessive 
centralization and bureaucracy. At Fiat’s Mirafiori plant, conversely, as Bigazzi 
comments, company technicians made far greater use of overhead conveyors than 
was typical in the US auto industry, permitting a rapid expansion of facilities in 
response to sudden changes in demand but necessitating a rigid central control and 
tight integration of the production process which would ultimately exacerbate both 
the logistical and labor problems of this huge manufacturing complex.
Yet without imposing teleological assumptions about the evolutionary 
trajectory of industrial and technological development, there can be no a priori 
grounds for determining which modifications of foreign practice may ultimately 
lead to significant innovations in a particular set of economic and institutional 




























































































“progressive” and “adaptive” or “regressive” forms of hybridization.75 Nor could it 
be specified in advance how far and in what ways the American model could be 
deconstructed, adapted, and recombined to suit European and Japanese 
circumstances, since this depended in the end on the imagination, reflexivity, and 
experimentation of local actors. Yet successful hybridization, as findings of this 
project suggest, also requires careful attention to the independencies among the 
constituent elements of imported and indigenous productive models. As in the case 
of modular product architecture, individual components of US mass-production 
practice could be redesigned or replaced altogether, provided that an appropriate 
interface could be devised to fit with the other parts of the model.76 Thus, for 
example, American-style automated equipment and flow-line production could be 
reworked to accommodate a more diverse range of products in smaller quantities, 
but only through complementary adjustments in tooling, scheduling, logistics, and 
job definitions, which in turn implied deeper shifts in management organization, 
industrial relations, payment systems, training, and supplier relations. To take full 
advantage of the additional flexibility gained through such modifications of US 
high-volume production methods, furthermore, European and Japanese 
manufacturers also needed to integrate them with product and marketing strategies 
aimed at extracting a commercial premium from the resulting ability to alter their 
output mix and introduce new models rapidly in response to changing demand. 
“Learning”, as Boyer et al. observe of contemporary experience with the diffusion 
and transformation of Japanese manufacturing practices, “may come from multiple, 
and even incoherent, sources. What matters is the capacity of firms and related 
institutions to pull such changes together and make their patterns of hybridization 
coherent” -  though any such coherence, like that of the original model itself, should 
be regarded as at best partial and provisional.77
From Transfer to Cross-Fertilization
Compared to much of the literature on postwar industrial Americanization, the 
studies prepared for this project tell a substantially different story. In these tales, as 
we have seen, the “American model” itself turns out to be riven with internal 
ambiguities, tensions, and disparities, while direct transfer mechanisms such as 
Marshall Aid, US technical assistance, transatlantic productivity missions, and even 
the imposition of antitrust reforms exercised a decidedly limited impact on 
European and Japanese industry. The crucial initiatives in the postwar assimilation 
of US technology and management methods came instead from European and 
Japanese manufacturers, engineers, and public officials, who drew on prior 
experience with imported mass-production practices or domestic analogues to 




























































































circumstances. In so doing, however, European and Japanese industrial actors at the 
same time reinterpreted, reshaped, and sometimes transformed their indigenous 
practices and institutions, while the ensuing process of hybridization not 
infrequently gave rise to productive innovations significant enough to be re­
exported back to the US itself. For each of these reasons, as we noted at the outset, 
“American engagements”, with its multiple, ambivalent, and highly charged 
meanings, rather than “Americanization”, or even its limits, most fully encapsulates 
the theme of this project.
The findings of this project point to the need to revise not only the 
historiography of postwar Americanization, but also the conceptual framework and 
vocabulary used in wider analyses of the international transfer and diffusion of 
productive models. The ambiguity and deconstructibility of American practices; the 
internal conflicts and diverse objectives of the would-be exporters; the 
knowledgeability, self-reflectiveness, and proactivity of the receiving agents; the 
prevalence of selective adaptation and hybridization; the blurred line between 
imitation and innovation; and the shifting roles and relationships among the 
participants: all these features of postwar European and Japanese reworking of US 
technology and management call into question standard conceptions of the 
“transfer”, “diffusion”, “dissemination” or “transplantation” of a single globally- 
efficient model of “best practice” across national boundaries. Even apparently more 
interactive categories such as “transmission” or “translation” seem inadequate 
under the circumstances, since they imply that the underlying “message” of the 
original productive model remains fundamentally unchanged when it is “switched 
up” and “switched down” between different levels of abstraction, or converted into 
a foreign linguistic idiom. A more satisfactory metaphor for the processes analyzed 
in this project would thus be “cross-fertilization”, as Giuliana Gemelli proposes in 
her study of postwar American influence on the development of European 
management education: an apt term for what Paul Lillrank calls in the 
contemporary context “the most promising [form of] organizational transfer’: ‘an 
intelligent learning process, where examples from abroad are used as stimulation 




























































































III. AGAINST CONVERGENCE: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historical interpretations of postwar Americanization, as we have often had 
occasion to observe, are closely bound up with wider contemporary debates about 
the putative transfer and diffusion of productive models across national boundaries. 
But just as the problematic of this project is deeply informed by current 
controversies over “Japanization” and the “new American challenge”, so too its 
conceptual approach and historical findings offer ample grounds for skepticism 
about the likelihood and desirability of international convergence around any single 
“best-practice” model of economic and technological efficiency, whatever its 
geographical origins.
In many respects, to be sure, the European and Japanese economies of the 
postwar reconstruction period constitute a “world we have lost”, more on the whole 
for the better than for the worse. Inconvertible currencies, capital controls, and 
scarcity of foreign exchange; import quotas and high tariff barriers; shortages of 
labour and raw materials; slow recovery of domestic demand and international 
trade from the ravages of depression and war: these distinctive characteristics, as 
the studies prepared for this project emphasize, mark the distance separating the 
conjuncture of the 1940s, 50s, and even to some extent the 60s from that of the 
1980s and 90s. In international terms, too, this era differed significantly from our 
own, with countries divided into hostile camps by the overarching bipolar conflict 
of the Cold War, and national welfare states partially -  though never entirely -  
insulated from the destabilizing forces of the world economy by the fragile regime 
of “embedded liberalism”, which emerged from the postwar policy struggles 
between the United States, Britain, Western Europe, and Japan.79
Japanization
Despite these evident contrasts, however, there are also remarkable similarities, 
both theoretical and empirical, between the issues at stake in historical and 
contemporary debates over the attempted transfer and diffusion of productive 
models, which can accordingly be examined within a common conceptual 
framework. Nowhere are the parallels with the historiography of postwar 
Americanization more striking than in the recent literature on “Japanization”. Here, 
too, for example, there are multiple and conflicting interpretations of the original 
model itself. Is the “Japanese production system” a sophisticated refinement of 
Fordism and Taylorism, which appropriates the tacit knowledge of shop-floor 




























































































instead represent a radically new technological and organizational paradigm, such 
as “lean production”, which reconciles quality, flexibility, and productivity by 
systematically eliminating waste and mobilizing the capacities and initiative of 
front-line workers; or “innovation-mediated production”, which blurs the line 
between new product development and incremental improvement in manufacturing 
through the functional integration of intellectual and manual labour?81 Does the 
“Japanese model” entail an empowerment of shop-floor workers through enhanced 
opportunities for organizational learning and devolved decision-making, or does it 
rather amount to increased exploitation through intensification of work and 
“management by stress”?82 Can a single national model be identified within Japan 
itself, or are there a multiplicity of industry and company variants, which differ 
significantly from one another in key respects? Is the “Japanese system” a bundle 
of discrete techniques and methods, such as just-in-time logistics, total quality 
management, teamworking, and continuous improvement? Or is it rather a tightly- 
coupled package of complementary elements, including on some views lifetime 
employment, seniority wages, enterprise unionism, and keiretsu relationships with 
suppliers and financial institutions? Is the efficiency of the “Japanese model”, 
however defined and understood, globally and absolutely superior to that of foreign 
alternatives, or is its performance advantage instead relative and dependent on a 
particular economic, social, cultural, institutional, and even political context?83
As in the case of postwar Americanization, too, there has been fierce 
controversy over the transferability of the Japanese model to other national settings. 
For some authors, such as the International Motor Vehicle Project at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology or Martin Kenney and Richard Florida, the 
Japanese system constitutes a universal model of productive efficiency “applicable 
anywhere by anyone”, whose principles and practices “can be successfully inserted 
into another society and then begin to reproduce successfully in the new 
environment”.84 Others, by contrast, have questioned how far the “Japanese model” 
could -  or should -  be transferred to other countries with very different economic 
conditions, social institutions, and cultural values. Adversarial industrial relations, 
job-control unionism, high rates of worker mobility, and strongly individualist 
attitudes in Britain and the United States; occupationally-based identities and skill 
profiles, industrial unionism, and statutory codetermination rights in Germany; 
authoritarian management traditions, limited workforce skills and educational 
attainment, weakly developed supplier networks, and macroeconomic instability in 
developing countries like Brazil: all these have been seen as formidable barriers to 
a full-scale diffusion of the “Japanese production system”, whether through 
directly-owned transplants or through indirect imitation by indigenous firms.85 As 




























































































over Japanization also reflect deeper theoretical disagreements about whether 
productive models can be effectively broken down into their constituent elements 
or must be implemented as a coherent whole, as well as about the balance between 
institutional plasticity and path dependency in the receiving societies themselves.
Current debates about Japanization began in the 1970s, and a large body of 
empirical research has now accumulated on the attempted transfer and diffusion of 
the “Japanese model” to different national and industrial environments. Although 
there is still considerable room for divergent interpretations of this literature, a 
number of substantive conclusions can nonetheless be drawn from its findings. 
First, Japanese manufacturing techniques and management practices have been 
broadly, though by no means universally, taken up and emulated in an extremely 
diverse range of contexts, including many which had initially been regarded as 
highly inauspicious such as the northeast of England, the US rustbelt, eastern 
Germany, or metropolitan Brazil.86 Second, however, as in the case of postwar 
Americanization, the “Japanese model” has been widely deconstructed into a set of 
interrelated elements, which have been more or less significantly modified and 
adapted to suit local circumstances, giving rise to a broad spectrum of national, 
sectoral, and firm-level variants. Thus, for example, Japanese automobile 
transplants in the US and UK abandoned their highly individualized wage and 
assessment systems in favour of rigorous initial selection and training of new 
recmits, while their counterparts in North American and Australian electronics 
have typically made less use of long-term employment and seniority-based pay 
than of other practices such as job rotation and internal promotion. Among US and 
European companies, similarly, Japanese techniques and methods such as flexible 
job assignments, quality circles, or just-in-time component supply have often been 
integrated piecemeal into more traditional mass or craft-based production systems: 
while wide variations can be likewise observed across the international automobile 
industry in the organization and operation of “work teams”, particularly as regards 
the role of team leaders or supervisors.87
As with postwar Americanization again, deviations from the original 
“Japanese model” are increasingly seen not as negative consequences of resistance, 
retreat, and compromise in the transfer process, but rather as positive opportunities 
for experimentation, innovation, and learning. Thus Japanese automobile and 
electronics firms have discovered through modifications of domestic production 
and employment practices at their North American and European transplants new 
possibilities -  some of which are being re-exported back to Japan itself -  for 
organizing just-in-time logistics over wider geographical distances, reducing 




























































































and white-collar employees, or even coping flexibly with a more diverse range of 
models. Often, too, European and US companies have drawn on a complex mix of 
indigenous and imported influences from several national traditions, including but 
not confined to Japan, to develop creative and original hybrid systems, such as 
Renault’s Spanish subsidiary FASA, Volvo’s joint venture with Mitsubishi at the 
formerly Dutch-owned NedCar factory, Opel’s Eisenach plant in eastern Germany, 
or General Motors do Brasil. In some cases, finally, Western manufacturers have 
used the Japanese example as an indirect inspiration for more radical and 
potentially innovative departures from established productive models like GM’s 
labour-management partnership at Saturn or Volkswagen’s “modular consortium” 
of assembler and suppliers at Resende in Brazil.88
The “New American Challenge”
But what of the “new American challenge” of the 1990s? How does the re- 
emergence of the US economy as a model for foreign emulation fit into our 
conceptual framework, and what are its implications for the critical assessment of 
industrial Americanization advanced in this project? Like postwar Americanization 
itself, current debates on the “new American challenge” are the product of a very 
specific historical conjuncture, in which the US industrial resurgence and “jobs 
miracle” has coincided with the tarnishing of alternative models resulting from the 
end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism; slow growth and high 
unemployment in European countries like Germany and France; prolonged 
recession and macroeconomic immobility in Japan; and most recently the Asian 
financial crisis. For many commentators on both sides of the Atlantic and the 
Pacific, moreover, these developments reflect deeper structural pressures towards 
international convergence of financial systems, corporate governance, labor 
markets, and productive organization on an Anglo-American model of “free 
market” capitalism: “globalization” of production, investment, and capital markets; 
the creation of new opportunities for exit by domestic firms from national systems 
of finance, innovation, skill formation, and industrial relations; the superior 
glamour and attractiveness of fast-moving American commercial/managerial 
culture compared to more staid forms of “Rhine” and Japanese capitalism; the 
declining policy and regulatory autonomy of national states; and mounting external 
demands for realignment of domestic institutions and practices with neo-liberal 
competitive norms from supranational bodies like the European Union and 
multilateral agencies like the World Trade Organization or the International 




























































































Such sweeping claims about transnational pressures for institutional 
convergence on the Anglo-American model have not gone uncontested, however, 
while a growing body of critical arguments and counter-evidence suggests that 
contemporary processes of “globalization” are neither so novel nor so far-reaching 
as is often contended. Thus international capital, product, and labour markets were 
in significant respects more integrated before 1914 than they are today, while 
government expenditure still accounts for a higher proportion of gross domestic 
product in most advanced economies than even during the 1950s and 60s. Most so- 
called multinational enterprises continue to rely heavily on the economic, cultural, 
institutional, and political resources of their home country; productive capital 
remains far from fully mobile; and national states may enhance rather than reduce 
their capacity for effective economic governance through participation in 
multilateral agreements and supranational bodies.90
It is beyond the scope of this paper to adjudicate these debates, which are in any 
case still at a preliminary stage. But a few observations can nonetheless be ventured 
on the basis of the postwar European and Japanese engagements with the 
“American model” analyzed in this project. A first concerns the prevalence of 
heterogeneity and hybridization within the contemporary US economy itself. Even 
more than in the 1940s and 50s, there is no single, coherent “American model” of 
productive organization today, while the resurgence of US industrial 
competitiveness has taken very different forms across sectors such as automobiles, 
steel, electronics, telecommunications, and biotechnology. Some elements of the 
current American industrial revival are rooted in domestic institutions and policies 
from antitrust, health care, and defence procurement to interorganizational 
networks between firms, universities, and government agencies. But others are 
heavily dependent on selective adaptation and modification of Japanese methods of 
flexible production, rapid product development, and collaborative supplier 
relations, thereby reinforcing rather than refuting earlier critiques of the limitations 
of US mass production and systematic management.91
A second observation inspired by historical experience with postwar 
Americanization concerns the practical limitations, political obstacles, and 
unintended consequences of attempts to reshape foreign institutions and practices 
along US lines. Even in a post-Cold War world with a single superpower, the risks 
of political destabilization may limit external leverage over strategic countries’ 
domestic policies, as can be seen for example in the modification of IMF 
adjustment programs in response to the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis. Liberalizing 
initiatives enacted in response to transnational pressures such as deregulation and 
privatization may likewise be reinterpreted and reworked by domestic actors to 




























































































retail trade regulation or Italian corporate governance arrangements in formerly 
state-owned firms.92 In the transitional economies of East-Central Europe, 
similarly, privatization of state-owned enterprises has given rise to sharply 
contrasting patterns of ownership networks, with direct inter-firm linkages 
predominant in Hungary and meso-level ties between banks and investment funds 
more significant in the Czech Republic, differences rooted in the pre-existing 
organizational structures of the two economies during the Communist era as well as 
in the contingent institutional choices of reforming governments during the 
transformation process itself.93
A final observation concerns the likelihood and desirability of selective 
adaptation, creative modification, and innovative hybridization of imported 
practices in meeting the “new American challenge”. European and Japanese 
automobile manufacturers, as we have already seen, have borrowed liberally from 
one another as well as the US to enrich and revise their indigenous forms of 
productive organization. Across a wide range of sectors from electric power and 
food processing equipment to pharmaceuticals and electronics, moreover, 
multinational enterprises increasingly serve as agents of technological and 
organizational cross-fertilization between national or regional systems of 
production and innovation with distinctive capabilities.94 Nor is such hybridization 
confined to the sphere of production itself. Thus informed commentators discern 
signs of the emergence of new hybrid forms of financial intermediation in 
historically bank-based systems such as Germany, in which increased reliance on 
external securities markets and emphasis on “shareholder value” goes hand-in-hand 
with pursuit of “learning by monitoring” through deliberative assessment and 
benchmarking of investment projects.95 A number of European countries such as 
Denmark and the Netherlands have reduced unemployment to near-US levels 
during the mid-1990s without sharp increases in inequality through various 
combinations of consensual wage restraint, negotiated reform of public social 
welfare programs, and intensive training efforts; while others such as Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Finland have similarly struck tripartite “social pacts” aimed at 
balancing macroeconomic stability, increased labour market flexibility, and high 
levels of social protection.96 For all these reasons, therefore, today’s “new 
American challenge”, like that of postwar Americanization, seems likely to leave 
wide scope for strategic choice and creative hybridization by local actors at a 
variety of levels, leading to continued diversity of productive and institutional 
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